

1420 NVN offensive March 30, 1972 - Faints Melascompli  
— personal affront to N — after his threats to Moscow  
+ Peking — attempt to deny his his rebellion (≈ Jett '68!)

April 3

Accused (Kairil) Jett of withholding info — offensive  
for fear N would repeat his threat of "an all-out response"  
if this was the long-awaited offensive

(Kairil explicitly excluded by N in planning for rising of  
Haiphong). ordered dismissed twice.

N's rage greater because he + HAK had once  
again misjudged the staying power of the NVNers.

When no attack at Jett, + after summit in Peking, HAK  
thought (Kairil) that NVNers might have changed their  
minds."

N - Bragging 25 Jan — US would have no choice but  
to react strongly to actions of NVNers designed to  
humble us. " (denies his own offense).

Peking increased.

1503: N presents "ultimatum" on May 8 — doesn't mention  
his concession on NVN troops (≈ Cuba II)

(HAK did not mention it in backgrounders — till fall)

Lennie D. Franks USAF apt who  
wrote Hughes in March '72 on "proto-reaction"

8-52- 48,000 lbs 24 T

(of 24 MT)

1973 Conclusion bombing



## Lies as Results

March: Le Chi Tho, junior FO official: HAK and center  
confronted for Asians. "It seemed to me that HAK didn't  
care whether you knew he was lying or not. When he  
lied, it was so obvious that it was humiliating to us—  
even a child wouldn't believe him. Too obvious lies do  
not make you angry, but humiliate you. That's what  
made Ibin very upset."

(HAK says Le Du Tho had made so many concessions  
that 'he cried with me. He was so sad about being  
to sign that he lied.'")

A Get 8 against

B "Real" " (needed demo to - intimidate NVN - after elections  
- persuade T? (equal)

C Better than B.

Did N regard delay + bombing (+ roadside) as  
needed to make B "work"; or, to get C? (with B as  
fallback)

[Compare: bombing of West Beirut]



handle - now?

N - rage, hail. (election) } a) Concession (NVN Treaty - South)  
NAK - wants final end to war } b) [THREAT?]

[NAK - with C & SU, settle all issues on favorable terms.  
(MS...) (get the state...)]

(held retreat Paris (no problem after May 15:))  
from w. honor

+ wants to punish Moscow & VN  
N - cannot survive politically a mil. failure - VN  
(NAK - wants negot victory ... through Moscow).

1463 - SU held accountable for actions of Hanoi [March - April  
'72 offensive] - even when they had less control than  
WH supposed.

[see Cuba II:]

April 9 - ultimatum to Dabryin! Summit at stake.

1983: N over-judged SU influence on allies in: May '72;  
Jordan, Cienfuegos, Chile, Bangladesh!

NAK - had to regard "NVN as chattels of SU" to  
justify concessions to China & SU as "price of  
restoring world order," not just, getting sums  
in an election year.

N: only ones who favored escalation: Hoj, Connolly, Haldean, Colson

N: Hoj to N: "how our reputation than how VN comes out is for us  
to handle these matters in a way that I can survive in  
office."